This paper shows that in American states balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline but they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. More specifically, we show that tighter fiscal rules are associated with larger average surplus and lower cyclical variability of the budget balance. However, the lower flexibility of the budget balance does not affect state output variability.
Introduction
Recent work on the impact of balanced budget rules on fiscal behavior has identified two critical questions. First, whether they are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline or, instead, whether they can be circumvented by creative aaunting. Smnd, if these rules are eff'ive, what are these benefits in terms of budget discipline versus their costs in terms of lost flexibility in fiscal policy. Less flexibility should have costs in terms of output variability both in a neoclassical fiamewor~because it limits the ability to tax smooth and in a Keynesian framework, because of the need for anticyclical policies. 1While balanced budget rules are rare for national governments, various forms of restrictions of this type apply to US states. Furthermore, US states provide a particularly attractive area for empirical research as most of the rules were imposed long ago, reducing problems associated with sample selection bias.2 In this paper, by looking at the experience of US state we conclude that balanced budget rules are effective in enforcing fiscal discipline and they have no costs in terms of increased output variability. Recent work by Eichengreen (1992) , Poterba (1994) , Alt and Lowry (1994) , Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) and Bohn and Inman (1995) has shown that, indeed, fiscal restrictions on US states enforce some budget discipline, in terms of lower deficits and/or quicker response to 'For a recent survey of the literature on budget rules and fiscal institutions see Alesina and Perotti (1996) . On the tax smoothing argument seeBarro(1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) .
2See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) and Ratchford (194 1) for historical details on the adoption of fiscal rules. negative fiscal shocks at the cost of lowering anticyclical policies. Ptily by drawing on this previous researc~we make a very simple point in this paper: the increased discipline generated by fiscal rules reduces budget flexibility, but it appears to have little or no cost in terms of more output variability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a very simple graphical analysis which makes our basic point in the most elementary possible way. Section 3 presents some supporting -nometrics evidence. The last section concludes.
Budget restrictions, deficits and variability
As our measure of budgetary restrictions we use the variable constructed by Anderson and the Adviso~Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) . This inde~which varies between O and 10 with a higher number indicating more stringent fiscal controls, has been used by virtually all earlier researchers into the impact of fiscal controls on US states. As we are interested in the impact of fiscal controls on overall budgetary policy, we adopt the relatively broad measure of the budget surplus used in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) . Others (for example, Bohn and Inmq 1995) have focused specifically on the types of expenditures covered by fiscal controls.
Reassuringly, the overall conclusions from both types of data appear similar. All of our analysis is for the 48 mainland US states. 3The reason for truncating the data period at 1988 is that we were unable to obtain data on interest payments prior to 1988 from our data source (the WEFA group), although such data appear to exist. All other regressions use data from 1965-1992. The next figure 4 cotirms that the cyclical variability of surpluses is lower in states with more stringent fiscal controls. Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen ( 1995) , this figure is obtained as follows. First we ran the following regression for each state for the sample 1965-1992.
where (D)S, is the (change in) the surplus as a share of output in state J and DY is the change in the logarithm of real output. Figure Thus, these simple plots and regressions show that tighter fiscal controls impose more budget discipline but also more budget rigidity.
The critical policy questio~however, is whether the rigidity imposed by the fiscal mntrol has economic rests. Figure 5 suggests that the answer is negative, at least if economic costs are where YST is the standard deviation of state product for the sample 1965-92. The coefficient on the fiscal control variable not ody is statistically insignificant, it also has the wrong sign.
In summary, the larger rigidity imposed by tighter fiscal controls does not seem to have an impact on state output variability, 5
Regression Analysis
We have run several regressions controlling for a variety of variables. Our results confirm the basic picture described by the simple plots of the previous section. Table 1 reports an example of these regressions. In these particular regressions we control for the size of the state, measured as the average of the logarithm of its nominal product between 1965 and 1992, a measure of its output compositio~namely the average proportion of nominal output emanating from the mining sector between 1965 and 1992, and a regional dummy variable for Southern states. It is generally 
Discussion
Tight fiscal controls which impose restrictions on deficits reduce average deficits and reduce budget flexibility. However this increased rigidity does not seem to tiect the variability of state product. This result can have two non mutually exclusive explanations. First, it may be the case that the stabilizing role of fiscal policy at the state level is simply not very important, so that reducing its impact does not have a significant effect on product variability. The second interpretation is that the fiscal restriction not only impede "good" anticyclical policies but also limit politically motivated and biased policies which may have a destabilizing effect. '. In shares of state product t-statistics in parenthesis. 
